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Increasing water scarcity, driven by growing population and water demand, has widely 
demonstrated the need to achieve more efficient allocation of water.  For a variety of 
reasons including heavy subsidization, the price of water faced by users is typically well 
below its economic value, leading to well-known inefficiencies.  Legal, political and 
social constraints make the removal of such subsidies difficult.  Within this context, 
markets for tradable water rights have become a favored approach to overcoming price 
distortions such as irrigation subsidies and to achieving efficient allocation of water.  Yet 
water markets also experience important challenges and limitations.  After discussing 
many of the practical and theoretical challenges to implementing water markets, this 
paper considers the allocation of water in the face of two common distortions:  (1) when 
in-stream flows are imbued with social value from ecological, recreational, and aesthetic 
uses, and (2) the presence of irrigation subsidies.  While, in theory, markets can correct 
the distortion caused by water subsidies, the public good value for instream flows leads 
the market to fail. Thus, even if water markets can be established, they do not achieve 
efficient allocation when instream uses are considered.  The rest of the paper explores the 
question:  if markets cannot achieve allocative efficiency, are alternative economic 
instruments available that might accomplish this objective?  A simple general equilibrium 
model is developed to explore the use of a two-part tax instrument to achieve the optimal 
allocation of water when instream water has social value and irrigation is subsidized.  
This two-part instrument combines taxes on the economy’s inputs (other than water) and 
outputs to correct both the distortion caused by an irrigation subsidy and the public good 
externality associated with instream flows.  This instrument has the desirable qualities 
that (1) it does not rely on the existence of well-defined and transferable water rights or 
perfectly functioning water markets, and (2) it overcomes the political and social 
constraints on manipulating the price of water directly. 
 
 
 
  
